To defend our way of life abroad we may need to reconsider how much junk food it involves at home.

It’s not every day that former generals and admirals speak out about children’s health and education. But last Thursday was one of those days. According to Mission: Readiness, a nonprofit, bipartisan organization led by retired senior military leaders, 75 percent of 17 to 24 year olds cannot enlist in the military because they fail to graduate high school, have a criminal record, or are physically unfit.

One trend called out in the report deserves special attention: America’s obesity epidemic not only limits the military’s recruiting base, but is a growing drain on the Department of Defense budget and hurts the readiness of our forces. The numbers are alarming. Since 1998, the rate at which active-duty servicemembers received a medical diagnosis of being overweight or obese increased more than 2.5-fold.

We all know Americans are gaining weight. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than one-third of adults in the United States are obese, double the rate in 1980; around two-thirds are at least overweight. (An adult with a body mass index between 25 and 29.9 is overweight; 30 or higher is obese. Someone 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighing 169 lbs, for example, is considered overweight. If that same person weighed more than 203 lbs, he would be obese.)

There’s no mystery behind this phenomenon. Less than 10 percent of high school students consume the recommended amount of fruits and vegetables daily. Less than one-third meet the recommended levels of physical activity. Children and adolescents average several hours of TV, DVD, and movie-watching daily. Sugar-sweetened drinks are everywhere, including schools.

These lifestyles, however, are reflected in our military, and the costs are considerable. One-quarter of DoD beneficiaries (which includes servicemembers and their families, and retirees) are obese, little better than in the general U.S. population, while 40 percent are overweight. As in the civilian sector, the military health system is spending a lot of money treating conditions that obesity promotes, like heart disease and diabetes. The DoD estimates its healthcare costs attributable to obesity at $2 billion per year, more than for alcohol- and tobacco-related conditions combined. The cost is sure to grow under an expanded DoD entitlement program for retirees (the Congressional Budget Office projects a near-doubling of DoD healthcare costs, from $46 to $85 billion, during the next 30 years), and could constrain other critical DoD medical treatment and prevention programs.

Then, of course, there is the impact on individual military members. The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center reports that rates of joint and back disorders—among the leading causes of lost duty time—in overweight or obese active duty servicemembers are three times higher than the overall active duty rate. Nearly one-quarter of servicemembers diagnosed as obese or overweight last year also were diagnosed with a joint disorder during the previous year.

Obesity may even play a role in the mental consequences of war, a link we’re only just beginning to understand. This year, a large DoD epidemiological study that includes many personnel who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan reported that servicemembers who don’t see themselves as healthy—which we know correlates with being overweight or obese—were at significantly higher risk for post-traumatic stress disorder.

The link between America’s obesity epidemic and national security is becoming clear to public health experts like Dr. Richard Carmona, who is especially qualified to recognize the connection. He enlisted in the Army, served in Special Forces, and was a combat-decorated Vietnam veteran before beginning his medical career and going on to serve as President George W. Bush’s Surgeon General. Dr. Carmona said recently that “Obesity is not just a health issue” but “affects our national and global security.”

The DoD is launching new initiatives against obesity. The military health system recently completed a pilot project using an internet-based program to help beneficiaries lose weight. Commissaries now have shelf signs with dietary tips based on U.S. Government dietary guidelines. More important, probably, is to help children establish healthy lifestyle habits. Investing in early education on food and health is a good bargain for America whether or not these children choose military service later.

And that’s something that healthy lifestyle campaigners and supporters a strong military—not always a natural constituency—can agree on.

Comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam are popular these days, as worries of another “quagmire” mount. But the most significant parallel might not be the wars themselves, but rather the divisions they cause among Democrats in Congress. As with Vietnam, Congressional divisions could set the public narrative on Afghanistan and leave the President with a political quagmire at home.

Democrats won big in the 1964 election, but President Lyndon Johnson struggled to convince his party to continue America’s involvement in Vietnam. Johnson was concerned that if South Vietnam fell, so would the other countries in the region; furthermore, he upped the ante on Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident earlier that year. Johnson’s war policy of “gradualism” called for steadily increasing military pressure against the North Vietnamese. Congressional Democrats, however, criticized this approach from both sides.

These divisions played out through televised hearings at a time when foreign policy differences were rarely aired in public. On one side, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright of Arkansas, heard testimony in 1966 from intellectuals who opposed an escalation of the war and called for a negotiated settlement. Shortly thereafter, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi held Senate Armed Services Committee subcommittee hearings in which military leaders testified in favor of escalating the commitment further than the administration advocated.

Since the Johnson administration proved inept at articulating its own strategy, the Congressional debate took center stage in the public mind. The national conversation boiled down to a discussion of two extremes—scale down or dramatically ramp up—and left no room for other strategies. The hearings, and the debate they shaped, crowded Johnson’s “gradualism” from the field.

A similar scenario could be playing out today. Intra-party fissures among congressional Democrats exist over General Stanley McChrystal’s request for 40,000 additional troops. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Ike Skelton supports General McChrystal’s request, but chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin is skeptical. Disagreement also exists between the leaders of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, with Senator Daniel Inouye in favor of a counterinsurgency strategy, and Congressman David Obey in opposition to a troop buildup.

Not only have Congressional Democrats begun staking out their positions, they have also begun pushing actions to advance their causes. Congressman Skelton is calling for General McChrystal to testify to Congress at his earliest convenience. In echoes of the 1969 Church-Cooper resolution, which restricted funding for expanding the Vietnam War, Congressman Obey has promised scrutiny of the administration’s funding request for any additional troops.

On the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, the President has already ruled out withdrawing from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Congressional Democrats have started a debate that presents America with a binary choice—give General McChrystal what he wants, or start getting out. But those aren’t the only two options. The President could send more troops, but perhaps fewer than requested. He could also re-tailor the mission by concentrating on the use of U.S. troops to train Afghan troops. Or he could maintain troop levels and change what the troops are actually doing. The list goes on.

The President has chosen to conduct a comprehensive review to determine which of these options presents our best bet for creating a successful strategy for Afghanistan—an eminently responsible action for a Commander-in-Chief. However, as he takes the time to reach a decision, the extremes represented in the Congressional conversation are growing more entrenched. If the President recommends a strategy that does not exactly reflect one of the two extremes—as is likely to be the case—he risks being drowned out in the public square, where those extremes have begun to take root.

In other words, the longer President Obama remains mum, the more difficult this task will become.

The President has clearly taken some lessons from Vietnam to heart, evoking that war while emphasizing the need to support our troops with the right strategy and resources. Vietnam, however, is also a lesson in how intra-party splits can hinder a President’s strategy, particularly if it’s an alternative approach that does not have its own advocates on Capitol Hill. Given the stakes, Americans deserve to hear all the options at our disposal in Afghanistan. By taking this lesson of Vietnam to heart, the President can help make sure that happens.

Jessie Daniels is a Principal of the Truman Project and is currently an independent writer living in New York City.

Photo courtesy of The National Archives.

America doesn’t need a missile defense system in Europe, or this new fear-mongering film.

With the relative silence of Dick Cheney in recent months, American political debates have been disturbingly absent of abject scare tactics (besides the occasional invocation of “death-panels”). Thankfully, the Heritage Foundation—a conservative think tank—has filled this vacuum with a “documentary” on missile defense. Entitled 33 Minutes, the soon to be released film purports to tell the “brutal” “truth” that a ballistic missile, launched from anywhere on earth, could strike the United States in a mere 33 minutes. But what this movie actually does is frighten viewers into supporting a ballistic missile defense system that is costly, ineffective, and undermines President Obama’s efforts to craft a realistic policy to counter the threat of nuclear weapons.

But first thing’s first. What is a ballistic missile defense system? To paraphrase comedian David Cross, it’s “a net made of magic, held in place by pixies.” While that might not be completely accurate, it’s not too far off. The idea behind ballistic missile defense is to shoot down our enemies’ missiles. Whether that enemy is Iran or the old Soviet Union, B.M.D. is designed to make it impossible for adversaries to attack the United States with missiles. It may sound like beautiful idea on paper, but it’s not so impressive in practice.

Click here to view the embedded video.

A B.M.D. system may not increase U.S. security at all. The ability to shoot down incoming missiles would make our potential rivals—namely Russia and China—uneasy. Even if B.M.D. worked, such nations could simply build more missiles to overwhelm the system. And making B.M.D. work is a big challenge. The physics involved in shooting down a missile flying at a speed of 2.5 miles per second are incredibly complex, and we have yet to develop a reliable B.M.D. system despite the billions of dollars that have been spent.

On taking office earlier this year, President Obama attempted to change this situation.  In April, he gave a stirring speech calling for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This was accompanied by concrete actions in September, when he announced that the United States would cancel the planned Eastern Europe missile system. Instead, we would implement a ship-based missile system to focus exclusively on a possible Iranian missile launch. Obama’s altered missile defense system should also greatly decrease tension with Russia, which will help us pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

Obama, then, is committed to protecting America from the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Adapting Bush’s B.M.D. initiatives to develop a more effective system is integral to these efforts. Yet the Right’s obsession with B.M.D. led to vociferous opposition to Obama’s plans. Republicans have accused him of “appeasing” Russia, abandoning allies in Eastern Europe and, ironically, “empowering” Iran. It is as part of this broader conservative campaign—a political attempt to paint Obama as weak on national security and reinstate a costly and ineffective program—that 33 Minutes must be understood.

This film has all the hallmarks of a well-funded fear baiting. Ominous music provides a backdrop to sound-bytes on ballistic missiles. Facts of questionable accuracy are combined with statements so vague as to appear concrete. One quote, taken from ArmsControlWonk’s transcript of the film, illustrates this perfectly:

“It’s very difficult to guess the number of states that will have ballistic missiles in ten years. If one follows a straight line projection, the number gets quite large.”

33 Minutes will leave viewers anxious about their security, fearful of apparently-imminent ballistic missile strikes, and no more informed about B.M.D. than they were before. And that is exactly what Heritage wants. As long as Americans remain ill-informed about B.M.D., convinced that any sign of weakness will result in Iranian missiles raining down on us, we cannot have a true debate.

Obama is crafting a foreign policy that will decrease unnecessary antagonism with other nuclear states, limit nuclear proliferation, support allies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and, most importantly, protect America against the threat of nuclear attacks. Simplistic fear-mongering like 33 Minutes will do little but undermine these common sense goals and harm America’s security interests.

LEARN MORE Read the primer on missile defense from the Council on Foreign Relations.

Peter Henne is a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University, and a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project. His writing has appeared on Huffington Post, Real Clear World, The Moderate Voice, and the Washington Post’s “On Faith.”

Photo from the Missile Defense Agency

There’s one bright spot in Afghanistan’s election debacle: The fraud investigators are taking their job seriously.

America’s war in Afghanistan isn’t going well. The problems in Afghanistan range from a basic lack of government services—particularly security—to some of the lowest human development indicators in the world. As if the country didn’t have enough to deal with, Afghanistan is now wrestling with the fallout of a deeply flawed election.

The ongoing debacle of the August 20 elections has only highlighted the depth of corruption and abuse in Afghan politics. Electoral authorities have found “clear and convincing evidence of fraud.” The European Union’s observation mission recently claimed that up to 1.5 million ballots could be fraudulent, enough to dramatically change the projected results.

While the elections have rightfully attracted much criticism, at least one reason for cautious optimism does exist: The Electoral Complaints Commission. The ECC, which is charged with investigating electoral abuse and irregularities, is taking its mandate seriously. It has ordered recounts at more than 2,500 polling stations, around 10 percent of the total. This is particularly impressive given the extraordinary pressure it is under to simply certify the “official” results and allow President Karzai to claim victory without a second round. If allowed to carry out its mandate unhindered, the work of the ECC could help restore some of the credibility in the electoral process, which in turn would translate into legitimacy for the government that emerges. With public confidence in the Afghan government at an all time low, this is critical.

In unveiling his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, President Obama said that the United States “cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causes Afghans to lose faith in their own leaders.” One way to confront that corruption would be to rally the international community to support the ECC. The 64th session of the General Assembly meeting this week in New York would be a good place to start. The people of Afghanistan would be reassured to know that the United States is still committed to one of the fundamental principles of democratic governance—that citizens choose their leaders.

Oren Ipp is a consultant in the field of democratic governance and a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project.

Photo of “Go Vote” billboard from Flickr user Todd Huffman (cc)

The president of Iran says the darndest things—but that doesn’t really matter.

This week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be in New York to speak before the United Nations General Assembly. As with previous such appearances by the Iranian president, the event promises to inspire little substantive debate about Iran ’s role in the world, its internal political divisions, or its controversial nuclear program. Instead, the Iranian delegation and its tireless critics here in the United States will bring us the kind of over-the-top dramatic performance that no VH1-produced reality show could ever fabricate. If only we could stop watching.

Ever since Ahmadinejad came to office following a dark horse election victory in 2005, the former mayor of Tehran has made himself into something of a caricature in Western eyes. Eternally impressed by his own revolutionary rhetoric, Ahmadinejad has not strayed too much from the regime’s preferred vocabulary, using the U.N. as a platform to speak on behalf of the “oppressed” and against countries that “occupy the homeland of others, thousands of kilometers away from their borders;” code for the violence perpetrated by first-world nations, which Iran, of course, would never allow itself to engage in.

It doesn’t help that his recent reelection was marred by claims that the vote was stolen, along with opposition street protests of a size and scope not seen since the revolution of 1978 and 1979.

But Iranian revolutionary talk has not tainted Ahmadinejad the way his anti-Semitic statements have. Aside from openly calling for the end of the state of Israel, the sole Jewish state in the world, Ahmadinejad has actually questioned the reality of the Holocaust—a move that speaks volumes about his lack of understanding of Western sensibilities.

Ahmadinejad hasn’t escaped the caricature label back home, either. Following his first visit to the U.N. in 2005, he suggested to Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli that a halo had formed over him while he was speaking to an audience of world leaders: “A member of the (Iranian) delegation told me, ‘I saw a light that surrounded you.’ … I sensed it myself too. … All leaders in audience didn’t blink for 27, 28 minutes. … they had opened their eyes and ears to see what is the message from the Islamic Republic.” The YouTube clip of the encounter made the rounds during the 2009 presidential election, cementing Ahmadinejad’s image as a person of superstitious religiosity, the kind that tends to embarrass the clerical establishment and only further alienates Iran’s millions of secular-leaning voters.

Of course, Ahmadinejad’s antics are only part of the story. Western reactions to the Iranian president have ranged from strange to outright comical. While still U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, in 2007 John Bolton called for Ahmadinejad to be “charged with inciting genocide,” an quixotic effort by the U.S. delegation that wasted time and dwindling credibility.

Not to be outdone, Columbia University President Lee Bollinger allowed Ahmadinejad to speak at his university that same year, just so he could insult him in front of a national audience, saying in part, “Mr. President, you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel dictator.” Bollinger’s words served as an insult to the Iranian nation, which, like every democratic and nondemocratic state in the world, deserved to have its leaders granted a basic level of diplomatic respect. The insult was also misguided—Ahmadinejad, perhaps despite his own hopes, is not even close to dictator-status. The presidency of Iran is a relatively weak office, with little say over domestic and international security matters.

With such extreme and useless language coming from influential figures in America, it is no accident that so much of the discussion in the media has degenerated into a false choice between embracing Ahmadinejad and his rhetoric, and setting the stage for a blind confrontation with Iran.

The United States—and the world—would benefit from long-term stability in Iraq and Afghanistan (both Iran ’s neighbors). This will be impossible without the Islamic Republic’s active and tireless cooperation. All negotiations, accusations, and debates regarding Iran and its political figures must be driven by our commitment to ensuring that the progress made by our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan is not undermined by our desire to “stick it” to Ahmadinejad.

Coming to an agreement with Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader and the country’s ultimate constitutional authority, should be the Obama administration’s focus. And as such it is difficult to see why Ahmadinejad needs to factor into the equation at all, no matter how eager he may be to sit across from U.S. officials and jump into one of his usual lectures.

Unfortunately, Ahmadinejad’s speech at the U.N. will serve as just another opportunity for politicians and the mainstream media to engage in a play-by-play analysis of Ahmadinejad’s silly and at times hateful rhetoric. Iran’s reality show, brought to us by confrontational figures in the Islamic Republic and the United States, will be just like reality shows on primetime American TV—predictably scripted and only vacuously entertaining.

If only the American public could stop obsessing over a talentless party girl, or hanging on every word of an equally overrated, attention-seeking Iranian president, our country might be able to focus on matters of serious consequence.

Nathan Gonzalez is the author of Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America’s Strategic Choice and the upcoming book The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East. He is a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project.

When it comes to American foreign policy, The Simpsons might just provide the lens we need to understand our own history.

For 20 years The Simpsons has satirized the banalities and foibles of American life. From Lisa’s precocious insights to Bart’s antics, the show emerged as Generation X’s reply to Leave it to Beaver and The Brady Brunch. Unlike Mike Brady or Ward Cleaver, there is no wise paterfamilias at the show’s core. Instead, there is Homer Simpson. Whether he is watching Itchy & Scratchy, eating donuts, or swilling a can of Duff beer, Homer, is an exaggerated American “common man” who embodies Americans’ naïveté, excess, and basic decency.

As a Gen Xer raised by and on television, I became a keen student of unrealistic depictions of American life and human motivations. For this reason I never liked Perfect Strangers. I could see Larry letting Balki live with him for a few months, but years on a fold-up couch, even after he was engaged? Though BJ and the Bear was a guilty pleasure, I realized well-adjusted men don’t live in 18-wheelers and have a monkey for a best friend.

Faced with this sort of competition, The Simpsons became a sensation because it was the first sitcom to realistically depict an American family. As an academic who studies U.S. foreign policy, I often think about what I learned from 1980s sitcoms whenever I go to conferences or review a book. In the hands of many foreign policy specialists, William McKinley might as well be Perfect Stranger’s clueless and spineless Larry Appleton, and Lyndon Johnson is BJ’s corrupt and scheming Sherriff Lobo. It is not as if McKinley and Johnson were perfect or even necessarily admirable men, but they were human beings who, like Homer Simpson, possessed a full range of foibles and noble characteristics. The same is true of American foreign policy writ large. The range of American international relations over time should reflect the crass, naïve, ambitious, and good motivations behind policy crafted by people.

In writing, I always keep “The Homer Doctrine” in mind. Inspired by The Simpsons, the Doctrine simply explains that even regrettable and downright bad episodes in American history are not products of a scheming Montgomery Burns-like imperialist, but are usually a result of Homer-esque laziness, naïveté, and bumbling good intentions. Similar to individual Simpsons’ episodes, the Homer Doctrine allows for very bad endings but also some happier conclusions. Mostly, it reminds me that foreign policy is a reflection of real life, and that historical interpretations of human actions and decisions should bear more resemblance to Homer’s befuddled attempts at parenting than J.R. Ewing’s machinations on Dallas.

Sandwiched between the civil war and the 20th century’s dawn, the Spanish-American War reflects the Homer Doctrine’s necessity. When historians write about it, many see it as a case of big power imperialism motivated by an imperialist United States. While the war had imperial results, its roots are much more muddled and Homer-esque than history books allow.

In the latter decades of the late 19th century, Cuba became embroiled in a bloody civil war where rebels fought to oust their Spanish overlords. Trying to maintain the last vestige of an empire, Spain separated civilians from rebels by moving peasants into “strategic hamlets.” Endemic war caused food shortages, malnutrition, disease and resulted in thousands of deaths and an emergent humanitarian nightmare.

Aghast at the news from Cuba, middle-class Americans organized and sent foodstuffs, supplies, and the Red Cross’s Clara Barton to the island. Even with supplies and the Red Cross, the civil war made Barton’s humanitarian task all but impossible. By the mid-1890s, middle-class Americans of all political stripes called for a “humanitarian intervention.”

As the movement for American intervention gained steam, William McKinley entered the White House. At first glance, the Civil-War-vet-cum-politician could hardly have been more unlike Homer Simpson. Pious, serious, reserved, and revered by those closest to him, McKinley was a Rock of Gibraltar—a president John Wayne could have admired.

McKinley eventually opted for war, but he is not the Montgomery Burns many historians imagine. Like the 20th episode of the Simpsons 16th season, “Home Away from Homer,” in which Homer accidentally drives Ned Flanders from Springfield by betraying his own principles and their friendship, McKinley lost control of events once war commenced. Indeed, the lure of empire, geopolitical realities, and the president’s racism and blindness to Filipino and Cuban nationalism resulted in America’s temporary acquisition of an overseas empire.

Whether it is Ned Flanders, Cuba, or Afghanistan, the “Homer Doctrine” remains instructive. American foreign policymakers, from presidents to national security staffers, are guided by a complex mixture of idealism, naiveté, selfishness, and sometimes a zeal for donuts and Duff beer.

Jeff Bloodworth is a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project and a professor of history at Gannon University in Erie, Pennsylvania.

Turkey has quietly held NATO tactical nuclear weapons since the Cold War. Removing them will be a critical step towards a safer world. But it won’t be easy.

On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama made a speech in Prague outlining his intention to make nuclear disarmament, with the eventual goal of elimination, the organizing principle of U.S. nuclear policy. Now the task is to figure out the how to actually get to zero nuclear weapons.

There are approximately 23,335 nuclear weapons held between nine nations: the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Less widely known are the five other states that hold nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, NATO deployed nonstrategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons  in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Today these aging weapons are more of a liability than an asset—their size and portability makes them attractive to terrorists.

The removal of these tactical nukes is an early step on the long road to zero. Getting the five NATO members who hold the tactical nukes to relinquish them quietly will take care, and Turkey may be the toughest piece in this particular part of the disarmament puzzle.

I recently returned from a trip to Turkey, coordinated by the Truman National Security Project, an institute that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of Americans to lead on national security. In discussions with government officials, civil servants, retired military personnel, academics, and businessmen, two things became clear: First, that it is difficult to be positioned at a geographical and societal crossroads, and second, that you are stuck with your neighbors.

The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions. I was interested in what the Turks saw when they looked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers varied sharply.  Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran. But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran. In fact, when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry said that Turkey would follow suit—immediately.

I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too, resulting in a “cascade of proliferation.” Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions, disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe.

Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club.

At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb.

Polling I had seen previously indicated ample public support in Turkey for giving up these weapons, but my trip there made it clear that polling, papers, and news reports are no substitute for actually going to a country and meeting with people. Most Turks I met would answer disarmament questions in entirely different ways, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced.

Removing tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey will be difficult, but not impossible. In order to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy makers have to start thinking about how things are connected. Countries like Turkey rely on nuclear weapons for political and security reasons. To feel comfortable without nukes, these countries must be convinced that their neighbors will not acquire them. That means efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles—including tactical nukes—and efforts to stop the creation of new nuclear programs must happen in concert.

Ploughshares Fund President Joe Cirincione notes that disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same coin: disarmament creates the unity needed to prevent proliferation, which provides the security needed for disarmament. I have no doubt that the Turks with whom I met would agree.

Alexandra Bell is a Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow.

Albania’s young voters try “Yes we can!”—but can’t quite yet.

I was invited to Albania to help the newly formed G99 party fundamentally change the way Albanians thought about and conducted politics. G99—developed out of Albania’s youth-driven democratization movement—began in 2003 in response to rampant government corruption. Inspired by the “yes we can” attitude in America, G99 wanted to try its hand at Obama-style organizing in advance of their June 28 parliamentary elections. Having spent the better part of five years in political organizing on different levels, including for Obama’s Florida campaign in the general election, I came to add perspective and experience to G99’s operation.

I felt proud to aid their mission. After decades of oppression and corruption, cynicism had a stranglehold on the country. G99 understood that they could not achieve a full democracy until the Albanian people saw themselves as agents of change and bearers of responsibility. Organizing strengthens democracy by enabling participation in the political process; it opens avenues for people to hold their elected officials accountable, to dictate the debates, and to confront the immediate needs of the community from the ground up.

But organizing requires volunteers and community building, and “volunteering” had been compulsory during the 45 years of communism. Walking through the trash-ridden streets, by the graffiti-covered public buildings from which the communist regime once presided, one understands why most Albanians feel an absence of responsibility in their communities.

These former political realities very much constrain Albania’s older generations. But they liberate its youth, who empathize with the past but see their country not as it is but as it could be. G99 sought to change all of this. Member after member of G99 told me of how they came to the organization asking the question: Why couldn’t Albania be better?

This was the very mindset of those who helped get President Obama elected, the majority of whom were under the age of 30. The “Millenial generation,” as it has come to be called, made up of those of us born between 1978 and 2000, has been shaped by a democratized access to information and the experience of growing up in a transitional, malleable post-Cold War world. We have a more optimistic, innovative, politically motivated mindset geared towards connecting the world around us. We are post-ideological and pragmatic. What’s more, the under 30 demographic accounts for over 50 percent of the world’s population.

Many Albanians work to leave the country rather than change it. These G99 youth, however, felt a responsibility to make their country better and, with 50 percent of the population under 28, know they are the only ones that can. But knowing that Albania should be better and knowing how to carry out that vision effectively are different things.

We did our best. I helped train volunteers and then watched them go out, elicit support, and empower others with their mission. They worked tirelessly and without precedent, the only motivating example was the vague understanding of the Obama campaign that they had gathered secondhand from my experiences and from newspapers. In the end, G99 came up short of its expectations and goals with less than 1 percent of the vote, gaining no representation in parliament.

I see this shortcoming not as an abject failure in G99’s mission nor in the lack of applicability of Obama’s model beyond the United States. Rather, I see this as an important lesson in democracy-building. Obama’s general model—of creating participatory democracy through community organizing—is replicable but only if adapted in the right ways. The Millennial mindset and energy will prove indispensable as these youth come of age, but only if harnessed and given the direction and tools to succeed.

G99 simply needs more time, more training, an informed strategy, and better resources. Ideally, they could also have a global network of youth leaders who are doing the same work, reaching for the same goals, and building off of each other’s successes—from Albania to Turkey to Vietnam to the United States. Ultimate success will not come in the short span of one campaign, but it can come if they build off of smaller successes. As tools like Facebook continue to give us a common platform, we have to work to create a common language. As the mistakes of our peers and the confines of our past continue to teach us what not to do, we have to work together to effectively learn what to do. These lessons and this language are not inherent even with the noblest of missions and the biggest of ideas.

We stand on the brink of a momentous opportunity to harness the power of a generation to redefine the way we relate to each other and to our governments and, in turn, tackle our most pressing challenges. But this window of opportunity is relatively small. Sure, there will always be youth ripe for empowerment, but the Millennial generation is coming of age now, and, given our sheer numbers, will set the political tone in countries around the world for at least the next forty years. These are the world’s future leaders, and we have to ensure they have the tools to translate “yes we can” into real solutions for today’s toughest challenges.

Erin is a proud member of the Millennial generation, an independent nonprofit and political consultant, and a fellow at the Truman National Security Project.